This article examines some epistemological debate on the essential guiding questions of;
What exists?
What is existence?
What is there in the world?
What is the way the world work?
What is its structure, and what is the case?
How realistic are political theories in our societies?
Abstract
Regarding the question of political realism, theories, and the question of certainty, the positions of realist and anti-realist are controversially based on their divergence arguments on certainty. The debate on certainty by social and political philosophers, social scientists call for a holistic reflection of whom to provide answers to the above questions. There are essential guiding questions modern scientists and political theorists fail to answer concerning certainty. One major part of this article, the reflective part, describe the controversial nature of certainty. Furthermore, the article tries to find realistic political theories position regarding democratic theories in the 21st century and the alternatives ways to reconnecting these theories with epistemological debate on realism and anti-realism concerning democracy, politics, and society. The article also examines the controversy of certainty as it tries to push epistemic questions towards political theory and its relation to social theories. In doing this, it concludes with a normative descriptive analysis without taking holistic sides on rationality, choice base and the idea of individualism, which seems likely to be the same for the post-modern political idealists with strong ideological bases on participation in a more descriptive sense. This article's central question is how realistic political theories are in our societies in relation to realism and the question of certainty.
Introduction
Scientific realism is the view that empirical scientists speak about their profession's to enlighten the laymen in their description of how the world works. The empirical scientists talk about individuals and properties just like trees, mountains, and people in the real world with a conviction that there is a good reason to believe that some propositions about these individuals and properties are true. Other truths about them await discovery. On this view, empirical scientists are steadily adding to the stock of things that we know about elements like; Molecules, force, electrons, genes, spins, which are being added to the more mundane individuals properties like trees and greenness we know, see or observed. While sometimes, they believe with good reason that some new thing has been discovered and later find out they were mistaken.
To begin, what is meant by saying that scientists believe or mean what they say. Presumably, this means that textbooks and journal literature where empirical theories are being interpreted, expounded are to be taken literally as putative descriptions of some parts of or features of the world. At least for those who understand the vocabulary, there is no need for any interpretation, reconstruction or more reconstructive of texts to understand what they are saying about the world but employing different theories and methodological knowledge, which to Cahoone (2016), is a body of techniques to investigating natural phenomena and the acquiring of knowledge, correcting and for integrating previous knowledge and claims. To be termed scientific, therefore, a method of inquiry is commonly based on empirical or measurable based evidence subject to specific principles of reasoning, as the Oxford Dictionaries defines the scientific method as a method of different procedure that has characterized natural science since the 17th century, consisting in systematic observation, measurement, and experiment. While this may be true of some theories, the formulation, testing, and modification of hypotheses in arriving at conclusions, a casual glance through the textbook and journal literature to even an old and well-established theory like Newton theory suggests that it is not true of all theories.
Scientific Realism
In the philosophy of science, the term ´scientific realism´ denotes a precise position on the question of how a scientific theory, truth, is to be understood and what scientific activity is. I shall attempt to define the term and discuss its possible alternatives, which is not philosophically based; thus, philosophy as a scientific tool has addressed the question of “the anti-realists which denies that theoretical statements have truth values”. (Kukla, 1998, p. 3). For example, experimental physics provides one of the most substantial pieces of evidence of pragmatic scientific realism. At the same time, other theorists try hand to categorize numerous entities that are in principle that cannot be observed and are regularly manipulated to produce new phenomena to investigate other aspects of nature that save as tools and instruments not only for thinking but for doing. These theoretical arguments, the empirical findings and uncertain resorts of entities provide new resorts that placed the realist and the anti-realist in the position of scientific uncertainty or truth through dialogue.
Critical reflection of scientific realism or anti realism is usually conceived in theoretical and empirical evidence for explanation and predictions. The question of certainty is tentatively inconclusive at the level of critical experimental practices in scientific theories, and truths are theoretically uncertain in the pragmatic or empirical stage. This position and other questions are scientific unique position that accept anything go, a departure from realism, is a great battle between scientific realism and anti realism. Sciences at different times exhibit different relationships between theories and experiments on how specific set goals of beliefs or prepositions of explaining common and uncommon phenomena in predicting the future like atmospheric phenomena, weather casting credited to similar organization like World Meteorological Organization. One chief role of an experiment is the creation of phenomena. Experimenters bring into being a phenomenon that does not naturally exist in a pure state. These phenomena are the touchstones of physics, the source of modern/postmodern technological tools.
Between Theory and Experiment
A theory is a set of propositions or beliefs that is used to account for practical experiments or to explain phenomenon, a particular set goal, while at the highest parts of the experimental method is the idea that a good theory should not only use words to build future results but also to explain existing data and to predict the results of future experiments. The question of realism, or what exists can be viewed to Uskali (2008) reflective questions on ontological realism, a philosophical thesis that deals with what exists?
What is existence?
What is the world made of?
What is there in the world?
What is the way the world is?
What is the way the world works?
What is the furniture of the world?
What is its structure? What is the case? One expects answers of the form to such questions, ‘X exists’ or ‘Z is the case’ or ’WWW is the way the world works.
Nevertheless, is it the task of science to provide answers to such questions? Then what is the role of distinct ontological reflection on realism? Realistic reflection can be related to Bhaskar (2008) on the conceptualization of scientific activity as a social practice, which owes much to Marx and Wittgenstein, is later elaborated and generalized to human praxis as such in the Transformational Model of Human Social Activity (TMSA), which in turn is further developed into the model of a four-planar social being. The transitive process as a whole is subsequently generalized, logically, to the process of production of human life as such, comprising everything currently being affected or engaged by human praxis, the whole material and cultural infra-/intra-/superstructure of society. Scientific, social practice at this stage explains the success of science, which helps to answer why some theories are successful, and some are not, while anti-realist explanations invoke more sceptical questions of reality. Anti-realists suggest that truth taken primarily cannot serve as the central notion of the theory of meaning. A condition that can be obtained independently of a speaker’s ability to recognizing that they obtain or fail to obtain set goals and a good reason to believe that the unobservable entities postulated by well-confirmed theories exist, which always lead to the empiricism of all time. Thus, some scholars claimed that the traditional realism/idealism issue belongs to an area of philosophy called metaphysics and that it has got no direct link, has nothing, in particular, to do with science. Nevertheless, more concern, therefore, is on a debate that is specifically about scientific realism and theories, social and political theories and is in some ways analogous to the traditional issues of the direction of postmodern Democratic ethical theories and values, and the debate in-between political uncertainty, realism or truth.
The Realist Position
Some realists do not agree that relying exclusively on observation alone creates empiricism
which limit scientific knowledge. On the contrary, they believe we already have substantial knowledge of unobservable reality, believing that our best scientific theories are true, and our best scientific theories talk about unobservable entities. Consider, for example, the atomic theory of matter (Atomic Theory, A) says that matter is made up of atoms. The atomic theory is capable of explaining a great range of facts about the world. According to realists, that is good evidence that the theory is true, that matter is made up of atoms that behave as the theory says. Of course, the theory might be false, despite the numerous apparent shreds of evidence in its favour, but so might any theory. For example, Thomson, a British scientist in 1897, was said to have found a mistake in Dalton’s theory when he discovered a small particle inside the atom, as shown below in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1 Dalton's atomic theory
(Atomic Theory, B)
The evidence in table 1.1 shows the nature and problem of scientific arguement on certainty, which implies that scientific truths are always inconclusive from one generation to the other. Atoms are unobservable and can be related to Democratic theories as not satisfying enough to be the best of all time. It cannot be exclusively claimed to be realistically practical, for realism is seen to be a claim about what entities exist, especially their independent nature. There are two aspects to realism, illustrated by looking at the everyday world of macroscopic objects and properties. First, there is a claim about existence, about air, spirit, body, the moon, sun, and all others are objects claimed to exist, as do the following facts: the spirit is being invisible, the body is visible, and the sun moon is being spherical. The second aspect of realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties concerns independent objects. The moon exists, and its sphericity is independent of anything anyone says or thinks about the matter. So, our construal of realism represents one well-established tradition. However, our characterization is chosen not only because of its lineage but also because it is the most helpful way to represent realism and anti-realism. It unifies realist debates across different domains and allows us to view current positions commonly held as opposed to realism as we continue to seek ways of understanding postmodernist positions on the certainty of scientific claims. To illustrate this, consider Figure 1.2, showing the various salient positions, views, but realism is far from the physical world.
Figure 1.2. On Realist Lens
Political Theories, Idealism, Realism and the Question of Certainty
Ontologically, realism in this diagram is a detailed view of what it is for X to exist; thus, we get a variety of realism depending on the value of X, which is believed to exist. Some can choose to be a realist about X, electrons, molecules, cells, minds, human individuals, nature, or social activities with antagonistic shapes of different kinds, and more generally about relations and causal processes. Nature and necessities, numbers, sets, parts, or wholes, even in secular states, moral scholars, traditionalist, moralist, ethical values are critically examined, as one can coherently be a realist about things while being an anti-realist about other things are view using different lenses of verification of what exists, and this logically makes realism uncertain.
In a nutshell, choosing a realist or anti-realist position does not determine what a realist or anti-realist is all about — being it Scientific, Democratic theory or Metaphysical issues as such. The position about X is a belief and not necessarily a choice, which implies the choice of some specific X at a particular point in time is subject to change due to the conditionality of uncertainty. Having thus listed some possible domains of existing objects and having made a selection from among them, the realist might leave it there. Choosing a position of some X, the realist position concerning X says that X exists. However, pressed by anti-realist arguments, the realist feels forced to take a few more steps. Anti-realists can go along with the realist to accept that X exists, to interpret the meaning of ‘X exists’ differently with a tentative conclusion of uncertainty. Realist raises the further question of what claimed about the existence of the existent, entity (s) or what is meant by X exists.
Nevertheless, on the alternative position of realism to Bas (1980), scientific realism is the position that scientific theory, construction aims to give us a literally true story of what the world is like, and that acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true while anti-realism is a position according to which the aim of science can well be served without giving such a literally true story, and acceptance of a theory may properly involve something less (or other) than belief that it is true. In the philosophy of science, the term ‘scientific realism’ denotes a precise position on how a scientific theory is to be understood and what scientific activity is all about. A view on the beauty of epistemological, philosophical ideas to the development of early modern science tries to pose some critical questions of; what does a scientist do then? According to these different positions, to the realist, when someone proposes a theory, he asserts it to be true. The anti-realist views it to the proposer, which does not assert the theory to be accurate; he displays it and claims particular virtues for its existence as an independent entity. These virtues may fall short of truth: empirical adequacy, perhaps; comprehensiveness, acceptability for various purposes. This position will be scrutinize, for the denial of realism does not determine the details here, and this leads to some fundamental notions that allow the generic division of the proposed theory, as a theorist is asserting to be accurate or not at a particular point in time. Therefore, the assertion of scientific theories by realists relates to a central debate of ´exact science.
Exact Science
This section reflects first on exact science more direct to science in particular since there have been conflicting debates on ‘exact’ and ‘inexact science’ in academic history, and this can only be more explained with links of theories as an invaluable tool in sciences. The notion of if to disregard theory pose a particular question of what is the purpose of science? Helmer & Rescher (1959) on the Epistemology of inexact science noted that the purpose of all sciences is to explain past events and predict future events and in doing so in an objective manner, while in exact sciences, explanation and prediction have the same logical structure. The idea opens the door to developing specific predictive instrumentation of expert judgment and pseudo–experimentation, involving simulation processes and, in particular, operational gaming relating to the vague language of uncertainty. At this point, it rests assured that exact science is based on predictions through technical procedures in rigorous experimentation by scientists in arriving at a particular set goal by derivatives hypothesis to the later stage through observational and experimentation processes. With these observations of the valuable nature of theories to sciences, theory on exact science serves as a part of the scientific tool in arriving at scientific set goals which are claimed to be realistic as it plays a vital role in experimental research.
Political Realism
Political realism concerning theories and uncertainty, the thoughts of Niccolo Machiavelli, a sixteenth-century Italian political thinker, and the seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes are also invoked to demonstrate how realism was founded. Machiavelli is famous or perhaps described as a radical scholar for his great practical advice to the statesman who would ensure that they remained in power and achieved their goals. Machiavelli has said to proposed guides to state leaders but often accused of being an immoral thinker. The term ‘Machiavellian’ denotes cynical and unprincipled behaviour, which describes people who act cunningly and subtly, unscrupulously manipulating situations to their advantage. However, there is no doubt that Machiavelli held an extremely dim view of human nature. Realists continue to argue about trust or sentiment in politics and point to Machiavelli’s wisdom in elucidating this point; Paolo Costa in Realism without objectivity Paolo (2017) suggests however, that a defence of realism along this line is compatible with a highly revisionist attitude towards the different regional ontologies, can be conceived as uncertainty reflection on realism. Rational reflection of Machiavelli’s dim view on human nature in connection with realist argument on sentiment in politics creates more relation of choice as to how realistic are political theories in the post-modern societies; this implies that political theories are uncertain theories that are misleading generations to the unknown. Therefore, if we claim that the world exists without objective beliefs and universals theories, there may not be certainty, just like this particular copy of an article titled; Scientific and Political Theories and the Controversy of Certainty providing further specifications of the constituents and structure of the world shows that our realism will remain rather uninteresting. Our critical mind does not only see these universal questions as metaphysics, logic, epistemology, scientific; instead, we all have made an effort in one way or the other to understand how best the universals are in any way connected to unique properties including our guilding pilitical tools.
A more complicated and exciting way to construe claims that the world is mind-dependent is an idea centre not on what types of entities exist, if they are material or mental rather, and what is involved in claiming that they exist, pointing or trying to limit scientific realism without considering the implications of the contradictory notion of what they claim to know. Some radical thinker sometimes claims that only real object exists, while properties do not. Therefore, what the realist is trading on this point is the perfect sound intuition that if theories were true unqualified, then all the sceptical attitudes towards scientific realism would likewise not be correct. If all those consequences were actual, we would expect theories to exhibit just that sort of predictive inaccuracy, which constitutes the anti-realist positions on the account mentioned earlier. According to Fine (2002), anti-realism, as so understood, has a long and illustrious history, while in the post-modern modesty, many are inclined to doubt that philosophy owns arguments that might genuinely serve to undermine what we ordinarily believe. Nevertheless, to Schipper (1985), realism does not just mean true to the hard facts. It is impossible to only determine facts quantitatively in a text or how realistic the text may look. What is realistic or accurate is not always probable (in the sense of credibility) in the reader’s eyes, who uses his own experience of reality as a touchstone.
On Descriptive Realism
In literary criticism, in philosophy or cultural theory, generally, the term realism is usually employed to describe a concern with how literary and artistic representation reflects reality. Here the fictional universe is judged with its appearance of being real. Thus, the application of the said concept is not dissimilar to how it is understood and used in idealistic critical traditions due to a particular history of cultural and robust criticism for and against realism. Criticism like in philosophy of language, philosophers, developed terms of theories are opened to distinct clarity in language word use, as serious attempts have been made in this regard. Ghenea (2006), for instance, reviewed how we can get to know a word. According to him, this process has reached two stages: one during which we can become familiar with the sound of the word and reproduce to the phonetic part and the second, during which we know how to use that word, the semantic part.
However, writers and critics see their primary task, use all available meta-languages to illuminate the fundamental character of cultural and artistic production about realism by adapting various conceptual tools to particular conditional realistic clarity in descriptive realism. Descriptive realism in literature examines critical realism and socialist realism. The first, which is evident in the works of novelists, and a host of other science writers, is characterised by an accurate description of the condition of modern innovations but without proffering straightforward solutions to the problems identified. The latter takes the continent's transformation as a matter of historical and political necessity and as the only way to create a better world by trying to eradicate and do away with the unrealistic to make an alternative for scientific, political and economic formation of the new world system. The term realism is used diversely in cultural practice, linguistics and the traditional logicains frames art to mirror reality, requiring cultural, epistemological, and representational authenticity. It is noteworthy that the term realism, in its linguistic sense, is applied to various things and to different methods of representing the real world. Even linguists ultimately cannot avoid employing the traditional meaning, connoting the degree of representativeness or actuality of art and literature. The significance is that the philosophical attempt to clarify the real and unreal often overflows the system order's relatively rigid categories. This logic provides different concepts defined, cannot fully interpret or represent the diversity of intellectual reflections on certainty in a universal ground particular to all.
While realism is not presently the dominant perspective in scientific research, historically, it has been the dominant tradition in most disciplines and subjected to trenchant criticisms. Realism has been subjected to detailed critiques from critical theorists, postmodernists, feminists, social constructivists, and Green theorists in recent years. Some 'critical' theories have not been fully understood and assimilated. The most devastating criticisms of realism and neo-realism concern its epistemological and ontological underpinnings. The fact that realism is understandable and straightforward to prominent realists is a strength of the perceived views. However, the opposing argument would suggest that realism is too simplistic, reducing the world, complex reality of things to a few general laws that are applicable over time and space and therefore omit much interest and importance from analyses. For example, Laudan (1984) explained that scientific theories, at least in such mature sciences as physics, are approximately accurate. The central terms in such ideas genuinely refer to objects in the physical world. They go on to insist that the approximate truth likeness of our theories (and the related authenticity of reference exhibited by their central con-cepts) explains why science works as well as it does. The hypotheses are successful, the realist maintains, precisely because they come close to representing things as they are.
Emphasising the principle of the power of science and the enduring features of the system fails to allow the possibility of a fundamental change of idea. Realists accept that some idea rises and fall but insist that the game's basic rules cannot be undone. In failing to accept the idea of substantive discoveries and changes, realism is inherently conservative, meaning that it is desirable to only those who would have things continue in the old ways as they are. Then, whether intentionally or not, realism may also serve to justify injustice because nothing can be done to change realism itself, just as it is in the political system and the government of our days. However, if we accept the possibility that the assumptions of realism are relevant only in a particular context, there is a possibly great danger in treating them as if they were universal truths: applicable everywhere and at all times. As Park (2014) reviews that science is successful, to the extent that it is successful because scientific theories result from a winnowing process which is arguably more robust arguably discriminating than other techniques we have found for checking our empirical conjectures about the physical world.
Conclusion
From afar, in providing universal truths, realism may have seemed the most appropriate way of viewing a scientific phase; the idea of universal truth may have held back facts or better directed at freeing us from realist despair. Realism encourages a very narrow view of the world from an ethnocentric perspective by emphasising the centrality of scientific and universal truth. Viewing human nature as inherently selfish and unchanging can claim that the nature of society one lives in can change over time and can thus change the human race, especially postmodern reactions and practices of scientific and Democratic ethics, at least may allow humans to be less selfish. Realists ignore, significantly downplays the degree to which political scientists might have collective and mutual interests in Democracy, underestimating the scope for cooperation and purposive change in postmodernity on Democratic values. Therefore, there is a need to rethink if postmodernist political theories are conducted rationally and, indeed, implied in the idea of rational revisioning of Democratic epistemic ethics. Rationality, choice base, and the idea of individualism seems likely to be the same for the postmodern political idealists with strong ideological bases on participation. The antecedents of postmodern realism positions have perhaps been selectively read or interpreted in a biased fashion. As people are fond of saying concerning innovations, selecting specific evidence carefully enough, it is possible to prove almost anything, with a note at this stage, a specific selectivity in the historical memory of political realism — the issue of political uncertainty is a topic of interest for future research.
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